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Abstract— With over 50 billion downloads and more than 1.3 
million apps in Google’s official market, Android has 
continued to gain popularity amongst smartphone users 
worldwide. At the same time there has been a rise in malware 
targeting the platform, with more recent strains employing 
highly sophisticated detection avoidance techniques. As 
traditional signature based methods become less potent in 
detecting unknown malware, alternatives are needed for timely 
zero-day discovery. Thus this paper proposes an approach that 
utilizes ensemble learning for Android malware detection. It 
combines advantages of static analysis with the efficiency and 
performance of ensemble machine learning to improve 
Android malware detection accuracy. The machine learning 
models are built using a large repository of malware samples 
and benign apps from a leading antivirus vendor. 
Experimental results and analysis presented shows that the 
proposed method which uses a large feature space to leverage 
the power of ensemble learning is capable of 97.3 % to 99% 
detection accuracy with very low false positive rates. 
Keywords- mobile security; Android; malware detection; 
ensemble learning; static analysis; machine learning; data 
mining; random forest 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
There has been a dramatic increase in Android malware 
since the first SMS Trojan was discovered in the wild by 
Kaspersky in August 2010.  Since then, Android malware 
have been evolving, becoming more sophisticated in 
avoiding detection. As the study in [1] revealed, recent 
malware families exhibit polymorphic behavior, malicious 
payload encryption, increased code obfuscation, stealthy 
command and control communications channels, dynamic 
runtime loading of malicious payload, etc. Not only do these 
anti-analysis techniques present problems for traditional 
signature-based detection, but also significantly increase the 
effort in uncovering malicious behavior and code within the 
Android applications.  
 
Due to difficulty in spotting malicious behavior, Android 
malware could remain unnoticed for up to three months on 
average [2]. Moreover, most antivirus detection capabilities 
depend on the existence of an updated malware signature 
repository, therefore the antivirus users are at risk whenever 
previously un-encountered malware is spread. Since the 
response time of antivirus vendors may vary between several 
hours to several days to identify malware, generate a 
signature, and update their client’s signature database, 
hackers have a substantial window of opportunity [3]. 
Oberheide et al. also observed that it took on average 48 days 
for a signature based antivirus engine to become capable of 
detecting new threats [4]. Although Google introduced 
Bouncer to its app store in order to screen submitted apps for 
malicious behavior, it has been shown to be vulnerable to 
detection avoidance by well-crafted malicious apps [5]. 
  
Clearly, there is a need for improved detection 
approaches given the evolution of Android malware and the 
urgency to narrow the window of opportunity for the threats 
posed by emergence of previously unseen strains. Hence, 
this paper proposes and investigates an effective approach 
that exploits the merits of static analysis and ensemble 
machine learning in order to enable zero-day Android 
malware detection with high accuracy. Different from 
existing work on Android malware, this paper proposes, 
develops, and investigates an extensive feature based 
approach that applies ensemble learning to the problem. The 
main contributions of the paper are: 
• A new high accuracy static analysis driven Android 
malware detection scheme is proposed, investigated and 
developed based on ensemble machine learning. 
• A large feature space approach is developed 
employing 179 features for classification decisions. The 
features are from diverse categories: API calls, commands 
and permissions, thus inherently resilient to obfuscation 
within app code as majority of the features will still be 
accurately extractable. Furthermore, a large malware sample 
repository is used, which when combined with an extensive 
features set allows the power of ensemble learning to be fully 
exploited.  
• Presents extensive empirical evaluation studies 
based on real malware and benign samples from a leading 
antivirus vendor’s repositories giving insights on the efficacy 
of the proposed scheme.  
 
Our approach is beneficial in several scenarios: from 
filtering apps to uncover new malicious apps in the wild; 
prioritizing apps for further (more expensive) analysis; 
policing app markets; verification of new apps prior to 
installation, etc.  The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. In section 2, a survey of related work is presented, 
followed by the feature extraction process in section 3. Next, 
ensemble machine learning is discussed in Section 4. Section 
5 presents methodology and experiments undertaken while 
empirical results are presented in section 6. The paper is then 
concluded in section 7. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
Several works such as [6]-[12] apply static analysis for 
detection of Android malware. Grace et al. proposed 
RiskRanker [6] for automated risk assessment and app 
profiling in order to police Android markets. Wei et al. also 
proposed a profiling tool for Android apps called 
ProfileDroid [7]. This provides a multi-layer monitoring and 
profiling system to characterize Android app behaviour in 
several layers. In [8], Batyuk et al. proposed using static 
analysis for identifying security and privacy threats. 
AndroidLeaks [9], SCANDAL [10], and the approach 
presented in [11] are frameworks that detect privacy 
information leakage based on static analysis. Furthermore, in 
[12], the Android Application Sandbox (AAS) is proposed 
by Blasing et al. AAS uses both static and dynamic analysis, 
where the static analysis part is based on matching 5 
different patterns from decompiled code. Static analysis also 
provides the basis for the heuristic engine proposed in [2] for 
detecting Android malware using 39 different flags. A risk 
score is calculated from the heuristics in order to prioritize 
the most likely malicious samples for analysis.  
Other previous works utilizing static analysis include 
Comdroid [13] and DroidChecker [14]. Different from [2], 
and [6]-[14], the approach in this paper leverages automated 
static analysis for high accuracy and robust learning based 
malware detection.  
 
Machine learning approaches to malware detection have 
been previously studied on PC platforms [15]-[19]. 
Investigation of machine learning based detection for 
Android platform is gaining attention recently with the 
growing availability of malware samples. Related work that 
apply machine learning with static analysis to detect Android 
malware can be found in [20] - [24] for instance. 
 
In [20], Bayesian classification was applied to categorize 
apps into ‘benign’ or ‘suspicious’ using 58 code-based 
feature attributes. The training and classification employed 
1000 Android malware samples from 49 families and 1000 
benign applications. The approach in [21] utilized 
permissions and call flow graphs for training SVM models to 
distinguish between benign and malicious Android apps. The 
authors derived one-class SVM models based on the benign 
samples alone and use these for identification of both benign 
and malicious apps. In [22], Sanz et al compared various 
machine learning schemes trained with permission features 
on their malware detection accuracy. Their analysis is based 
on 249 malware samples and 347 benign apps. Sarma et al. 
[23] and Peng et al. [24] also apply permissions to train 
SVM based and Bayesian based models respectively for risk 
ranking of Android apps. D. –J. Wu et al. proposed 
DroidMat in [25], where Android malware is detected using 
k-means clustering after computing the required number of 
clusters by Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) approach. 
They present experimental results based on 238 Android 
samples from 34 families together with 1500 benign apps. 
Our work differs from [20]-[25], as our static analysis driven 
approach leverages ensemble learning driven by a more 
extensive feature set comprising 179 feature attributes (from 
API calls, commands, and permissions). Additionally, our 
study utilizes a larger malware dataset than the previous 
works. 
 
In [26], the authors also apply machine learning with 
static analysis, but utilize Linux malware rather than Android 
malware samples. Their approach extracts Linux system 
commands within Android and use the readelf command to 
output a list of referenced function calls for each system 
command. Some proposed Android malware detection 
methods are based on dynamic analysis. Shabtai et al. [27], 
[28] proposed a host-based solution that continuously 
monitors various features and events like CPU consumption, 
number of packets sent, number of running processes, 
keyboard/touch-screen pressing etc. Machine learning 
anomaly detectors are then applied to classify the collected 
data into normal or abnormal. M. Zhao et al. propose 
AntiMalDroid in [29]. AntiMalDroid is a software behavior 
signature based malware detection framework that uses SVM 
to detect malware and their variants in runtime and extend 
malware characteristics database dynamically. Logged 
behaviour sequence is used as the feature for model training 
and detection. Crowdroid [30] is proposed as a behavior-
based malware detection system that traces system calls 
behavior, converts them into feature vectors and applies k-
means algorithm to detect malware. Enck et al. [31] perform 
dynamic taint tracking of data in order to reveal to a user 
when an app is trying to exfiltrate sensitive data. 
3. APPLICATION FEATURE EXTRACTION 
In order to obtain the features used in the machine 
learning based detection, an extended version of our Java 
based APK analysis tool described in [20] was used. As 
shown in Figure 1, the tool is enhanced with database storage 
of feature vectors extracted from app corpus to drive the 
training phase. The tool, which embeds a Baksmali 
disassembler [32], can also classify unknown apps using 
trained models. 
 
The feature extraction is accomplished using feature 
detectors that extract 65 features comprising critical 
(Android and Java) API calls and commands as described in 
[20]. These make up the ‘applications attributes’ feature set. 
A further 130 features are extracted using permissions 
detector that mines the ‘Manifest file’ to detect the app 
permissions.   
 
3.1 Proposed feature set 
 
For the purpose of our research, we developed 65 
features (54 of which were subsequently used) from API 
calls and (Linux/Android) command sets. The APIs include 
(SMS manager APIs (for sending, receiving, reading SMS 
messages etc.); Telephony manager APIs (for accessing 
device ID, subscriber ID, network operator, SIM serial 
number, line number etc.); Package manager APIs (for 
listing installed packages, installing additional packages 
etc.).  
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Figure 1: Custom built APK analyzer for feature extraction and classification to identify malicious Android applications. 
 
 
The API calls feature extraction also includes detection 
(within the disassembled .smali code) of Java API calls for 
encryption, reflection, JNI usage, dynamic class loading, 
creation of new processes, and runtime execution of 
processes.  
Features were also derived from specific Linux 
commands e.g.  shell commands like ‘chmod’, ‘chown’, 
‘mount’, and specific strings like ‘/sys/bin/sh’ etc. which 
enable malware to escalate privilege, root devices, or execute 
malicious shell scripts at run time. Other type of commands 
defined as features include Android commands like ‘pm 
install’ which can be used for stealthy installation of 
additional malicious packages. All APK subfolders are also 
inspected for extracting command based features. 
Permissions extracted from the Manifest file provided 
additional set of features. Although all of the 130 standard 
permissions were included, only 125 were subsequently used 
(see section 5).  An extensive and diverse set of features 
were chosen for the following reasons: 
 
a) Robustness: each set of features are extracted from 
different parts of the APK (API calls from dex executable, 
permissions from the Manifest file, and commands are 
mostly detected outside of the app’s executable). Should 
feature extraction from dex executable fail for example, 
the permissions would still be obtainable from the 
Manifest file. Furthermore, if for instance, malware 
incorporates encryption to prevent detection of commands, 
API call features (including the crypto API) will still be 
detectable along with permissions to expose the app’s 
malicious intent. This measure of resilience is enabled by 
the fact that all of the features will  be utilized in the 
ensemble learning approach unlike with other algorithms 
e.g. Naïve Bayes were feature ranking and selection are 
necessary for optimum performance. Our approach is 
contrary to most existing work where ranking and 
selection steps are used to reduce the feature set. In that 
regard, such existing approaches will have a less resilient 
feature set compared to ours. 
 
b) Performance: the diversity and extent of the 
features employed is actually advantageous to ensemble 
learning as it provides greater degree of freedom to 
introduce randomness in feature selection. Additionally, by 
employing a large malware repository in our work, both 
the features and instances provide randomization 
opportunities which enhance ensemble learning 
performance as explained further in section 4.  
 
4. ENSEMBLE MACHINE LEARNING 
Ensemble learning builds a prediction model by 
combining the strengths of a collection of simpler base 
models [33]. For our  classification problem the application 
of Random Forest, an ensemble learning method, is proposed 
to learn the app characteristics based on all of  the 179 
features (unlike previous machine learning-based 
approaches that advocate a pre-training stage of  ‘ranking 
and feature reduction’ for improved performance) . The 
model can then be used in classifying new Android 
applications into suspicious or benign. Random Forest 
combines random Decision Trees with Bagging to achieve 
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very high classification accuracy [34]. This paper focuses on 
investigating how the power of ensemble learning can be 
applied to improve Android malware detection. By means of 
datasets composed of extracted features from a large 
repository of malware and benign apps, Random Forest 
based classification is investigated under different 
experimental scenarios. Furthermore, comparative analysis is 
made to Naïve Bayes, Decision Trees, Random Trees, and 
Simple Logistic (another ensemble learning technique based 
on boosting).  
 
Decision Trees (DT) are sequential models, which 
logically combine a sequence of tests that compare a numeric 
attribute against a threshold value or a nominal attribute 
against a set of possible values [35]. DT algorithms select the 
next best feature during splits by employing information 
entropy or Gini impurity respectively given by (1) and (2): 
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where fi is the fraction of items labelled with value i from 
m categories and GI is known as the Gini Index. 
  
The Random Tree algorithm [36] departs from the 
tradition DT method by testing a given number of random 
features at each node of the tree and performs no pruning. 
Random Forest uses Bagging (bootstrap aggregation) to 
produce a diverse ensemble of Random Trees independently 
trained on distinct bootstrap samples obtained by random 
sampling the given set N’ <= N times with replacement. 
 
4.1 Random forest algorithm 
 
Random Forest applies Bagging to generate a diverse 
ensemble of classifiers by introducing randomness into the 
learning algorithms input [37]. Diversity is also achieved by 
random feature subset selection during node splitting [34]. 
Hence, our classification scenario where we apply all 179 
features could benefit from these two dimensions of 
randomness to improve accuracy. The Random Forest 
algorithm is summarized in Figure 2. The training variables 
are the number of trees T and the number of features m from 
the input feature space to be randomly selected at each split 
of the base tree construction.  
 
Random Forest has several advantages that can be 
leveraged for improved machine learning based detection: no 
special preprocessing of input is required; can deal with 
large numbers of training instances, missing values, 
irrelevant features, etc. More importantly training and 
prediction phases are both fast, and they are more amenable 
to parallelization than Boosting-based ensemble learners (e.g. 
Simple Logistic).  
 
Random forest algorithm
1. for b = 1 to B:
(a) Draw a bootstrap sample Z* of size N from the training data.
(b) Grow a random-forest tree Tb to the bootstrapped data, by
recursively repeating the following steps from each terminal
node of the tree, until the minimum node size nmin is reached:
i. Select m variables at random from the p variables.
ii. Pick the best variable/ split-point among the m. (e.g.
using Gini index)
iii. Split the node into two daughter nodes.
1. Output the ensemble of trees
To make a prediction at a new point x:
Let be the class prediction of the bth random-forest tree.
Then = majority vote
1{ }
B
bT
ˆ ( )bC x
ˆ ( )B
rf
C x
1
ˆ{ ( )}BbC x
 
Figure 2: The Random Forest algorithm. 
 
4.2 Simple logistic algorithm 
Simple Logistic is an ensemble learning method based on 
‘Boosting’. Simple Logistic utilizes additive logistic 
regression using simple regression functions as base 
learners.  The base learner in Simple Logistic is a regression 
model based on a single attribute (feature), i.e. the one that 
maximizes the log-likelihood: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
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               (3)    
 
where m is the number of features. 
 
Logistic regression models are built and fitted using 
LogitBoost [37] which performs additive logistic regression. 
Cross-validation is used to determine the number of 
iterations to perform which also supports automatic 
attribute/feature selection [38] [39]. The additive logistic 
regression algorithm is summarized in Figure 3. 
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Additive logistic regression
Model generation
for j = 1 to t iterations do:
for each feature vector f[i] do:
1: set the target value for the regression to
c[i] = (y[i] – P(1| f[i]))/ [P(1|f[i]) * (1 – P(1| f[i])]
2: set the weight w[i] of instance f[i] to :
P(1| f[i]) * (1-P(1| f[i])
3: fit a regression model r[j] to the data with
class values c[i] and weights w[i]
Classification
Predict class 1 if P(1| f) > 0.5, otherwise predict class 0
 
Figure 3: Algorithm for binary additive logistic regression. 
 
 
5. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTS 
The custom built APK analyzer shown in Figure 1 was 
utilized in extracting the selected features from a collection 
of benign apps and recent malware samples. The analyzer 
was run across a total of 6,863 applications (obtained from 
McAfee’s internal repository); 2925 of these were malware 
while 3938 apps were benign. The extracted features were 
converted into binary feature vectors with a 0 or 1 indicating 
the absence/presence of a feature. These were stored in a 
MySQL database for the training and testing phases. 
 
Out of the initial 65 non-permission based features 54 of 
these were selected to produce feature vectors for the 
training phase. The eliminated features were those with no 
occurrences in either class. Out of the 130 permissions 
features, 5 had no occurrence in either class i.e.: 
ADD_VOICEMAIL, SET_POINTER_SPEED, USE_SIP, 
WRITE_PROFILE, WRITE_SOCIAL_STREAM. Hence 
the experiments were based on the remaining 125 permission 
features and 54 API and command based features yielding a 
total of 179 training features. 
 
In order to investigate the effect of feature diversity, three 
separate feature sets were created for training models and 
comparative analysis: (a) Feature set consisting of vectors 
from the 54 application attribute features only (b) Feature set 
of vectors from the 125 permissions only (c) Feature set 
consisting of vectors from a mix of all the (diverse) 179 
property vectors (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Feature sets for model building 
Feature set Number of features 
App attributes  features (AF) 54 
Permission features       (PF) 125 
Combined app attributes and 
Permission  features    (CAPF) 
179 
 
The learning algorithms were investigated with the three 
feature sets in order to evaluate their classification 
performance using the following evaluation metrics.  
Accuracy and Error Rate are respectively given by: 
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The false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR), 
true positive rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR) and 
precision (р) are defined as follows: 
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6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Results of the experiments undertaken are discussed in 
this section. Note that all results are obtained using 10-fold 
cross validation where training and testing sets are different. 
 
6.1 Naïve Bayes results 
 
Results from the Naïve Bayes algorithm are presented in 
Table 2 showing performance of PF (permissions feature set 
with 125 features), AF (application attributes feature set with 
54 features) and several configurations of the CAPF 
(combined feature sets with 179 features): i.e. top 10, 15, 20, 
and 25 features ranked using Mutual Information feature 
selection [40]. 
 
With Naïve Bayes, the best detection rate of 85.4% was 
obtained with the top 10 features from the CAPF set.  This is 
depicted in the Bayes (10) CAPF row of Table 2. The top 20 
mixed features from MI ranking together with their 
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frequency of appearance over the entire 6, 863 labeled app 
instances are shown in Table 3. They include SEND_SMS, 
RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS which are from the 
permissions feature set, and also ‘remount’, ‘/system/app’, 
‘chown’, ‘createSubprocess’, which are from the app 
attributes feature set. The results in Table 2 shows that with 
the Naïve Bayes algorithm, for best detection rates, the 
CAPF feature set should be utilized. Note that all the results 
of the experiments were obtained using 10-fold cross 
validation.  
 
6.2 Simple Logistic, Decision Tree and Random Tree results 
 
Simple Logistic results are presented in Table 4, while 
those of Decision Tree and Random Trees are given in 
Tables 5 and 6 respectively. In terms of comparative 
performance with corresponding feature sets, Simple 
Logistic performed better than Bayesian. When trained with 
the 179 mixed features (CAPF), a detection rate of 
approximately 91% is achieved with 4.6% false positive rate. 
With Decision Tree classification, TPR of 94.8% and 
corresponding FPR of 4% were obtained using the CAPF set.  
As with the Simple Logistics and Naïve Bayes, the CAPF 
Decision Tree classifier enables better detection rates than 
either PF or AF based Decision Tree classifiers. On the other 
hand, the false positive rates for CAPF and AF feature sets 
were similar, but also better than that of PF. Overall AUC 
performance is good for both AF feature set and CAPF 
feature set Decision Trees. Therefore, an FPR-TPR trade off 
to improve detection rates is feasible (given the low FPRs of 
3.9 % and 4 % respectively). 
 
Table 2: Results from Naïve Bayes classifiers 
Feature set TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR AUC 
Bayes (179) 
CAPF 0.821 0.913 0.087 0.179 0.867 0.133 0.915 
Bayes (25) 
CAPF 0.826 0.918 0.082 0.174 0.872 0.128 0.906 
Bayes (20) 
CAPF 0.844 0.921 0.079 0.156 0.883 0.118 0.908 
Bayes(15) 
CAPF 0.829 0.918 0.082 0.171 0.874 0.127 0.903 
Bayes (10) 
CAPF 0.854 0.913 0.087 0.146 0.884 0.117 0.895 
Bayes (54) 
AF 0.565 0.928 0.072 0.435 0.747 0.253 0.873 
Bayes (125) 
PF 0.68 0.886 0.114 0.32 0.783 0.217 0.86 
Table 3: Top 20 CAPF features ranked using Mutual Information. 
Feature Benign Malware Information gain score 
SEND_SMS 128 1557 0.260525 
RECEIVE_SMS 127 976 0.126554 
READ_SMS 140 900 0.107046 
remount 30 628 0.098938 
/system/app 55 687 0.098179 
chown 51 668 0.096293 
createSubprocess 5 531 0.096111 
WRITE_SMS 89 720 0.090689 
 /system/bin/sh 36 596 0.089475 
 mount 146 810 0.088369 
 abortBroadcast 48 618 0.08799 
 READ_PHONE_STATE 2016 2378 0.072633 
 TelephonyManager 2168 2451 0.069811 
 TelephonyManager 
_getSubscriberId 
480 1094 0.063550 
 chmod 459 999 0.053325 
Ljava_net_URLDecoder 1539 445 0.051456 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 2973 1453 0.051394 
RESTART_PACKAGES 142 597 0.050407 
 CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 297 756 0.048716 
Ljavax_crypto_spec_SecretKeySpec 1719 592 0.044834 
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Table 4: Results from Simple logistic classifiers 
Feature set TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.801 0.924 0.076 0.199 0.863 0.138 0.886 0.925 
AF 0.835 0.943 0.057 0.165 0.889 0.111 0.916 0.938 
CAPF 0.909 0.954 0.046 0.091 0.932 0.069 0.937 0.977 
 
Table 5: Results from Decision tree classifiers 
Feature set TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.87 0.938 0.062 0.13 0.904 0.096 0.912 0.934 
AF 0.939 0.961 0.039 0.061 0.950 0.050 0.948 0.967 
CAPF 0.948 0.960 0.04 0.052 0.954 0.046 0.946 0.964 
 
The results from Random Tree classifier under different 
parameter settings are shown in Table 6. The number of 
random variables selection at each split during tree 
construction (i.e. k), is varied from log2f+1, to 20 and 50 
respectively. For each k configuration, the PF, AF and CAPF 
feature sets were applied to train and evaluate the Random 
Tree classifiers. 
 
Table 6: Results from Random tree classifiers 
Feature set 
(k=log2f+1) TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.901 0.928 0.072 0.099 0.915 0.085 0.903 0.934 
AF 0.946 0.949 0.051 0.054 0.948 0.053 0.933 0.952 
CAPF 0.955 0.952 0.048 0.045 0.954 0.047 0.936 0.954 
Feature set 
K=20 TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.902 0.922 0.078 0.098 0.912 0.088 0.895 0.933 
AF 0.948 0.95 0.05 0.052 0.949 0.051 0.934 0.955 
CAPF 0.96 0.956 0.044 0.04 0.958 0.042 0.942 0.960 
Feature set 
K=50 TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.898 0.928 0.072 0.102 0.913 0.087 0.902 0.933 
AF 0.951 0.951 0.049 0.049 0.951 0.049 0.935 0.958 
CAPF 0.961 0.956 0.044 0.039 0.959 0.041 0.942 0.960 
6.3 Random Forest results 
For the Random forest algorithms, two parameters 
needed for training the models are the number of trees in the 
ensemble, T, and the number of random variables selection 
at each split during tree construction, k.  As with the Random 
Tree classifier, k is varied from log2f +1, to 20 and 50 
respectively; and for each k configuration, the three feature 
sets were compared. The results for T = 10 trees (from 10-
fold cross-validation) are given in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Results from Random forest classifiers. 
Feature set 
(k=log2f+1) TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.901 0.949 0.051 0.099 0.925 0.075 0.929 0.966 
AF 0.954 0.971 0.029 0.046 0.963 0.037 0.961 0.987 
CAPF 0.971 0.977 0.023 0.029 0.974 0.026 0.969 0.992 
Feature set 
K=20 TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.898 0.944 0.056 0.102 0.921 0.079 0.922 0.969 
AF 0.956 0.969 0.031 0.044 0.963 0.037 0.958 0.987 
CAPF 0.972 0.975 0.025 0.028 0.974 0.026 0.967 0.993 
Feature set 
K=50 TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR Prec. AUC 
PF 0.901 0.94 0.06 0.099 0.921 0.079 0.918 0.966 
AF 0.955 0.961 0.039 0.045 0.958 0.042 0.948 0.986 
CAPF 0.973 0.977 0.023 0.027 0.975 0.025 0.969 0.993 
 
As with the Random Tree, the results of the Random 
Forest classification are not very sensitive to variation in k.  
However, the best detection rates, lowest false positive rates 
and largest AUC occur simultaneously with the CAPF 
feature set. This not only confirms the robustness of Random 
Forest to large number of input training features, but also 
justifies our large (179) feature set approach which yields 
high fidelity malware detection via improved accuracy. Also, 
the number of trees T had a negligible impact on 
performance when increased from 10 to 50 (for all the 
different values of k) and are therefore omitted. 
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Figure 4: ROC curve for Random Forest. 
From Table 7, a very high classification accuracy of 
97.6% is observed in the k = 50 configuration. Malware 
detection rates (TPR) are 97.2% and 97.3 % with 2.5% and 
2.3% false positive rates for k=20 and k=50 respectively.  
These results outperform all the previously discussed 
algorithms. Also, Figure 4 illustrates the AUC for the 
Random Forest classifier of mixed features for k= 50.  It can 
Author’s personal copy 
be seen that with ROC area of 0.993, malware detection rate 
can be improved to 98.6% for 6.3% false positive rate and 
99% for 10% false positive rate. These higher TPR 
operating points will suffice for some application scenarios 
e.g. filtering apps to prioritize resource allocation for 
further/manual analysis. 
Figures 5 and 6 show graphical comparisons of the 
different classifier performances (with CAPF features set). 
Not only does the Random Forest learner perform very well 
with our mixed features dataset, but also model building time 
was quite fast. Random Forest (10 trees) learning with k= 8, 
20 and 50 respectively take 1.48s, 2.96s and 6.41 seconds to 
build. With Decision Tree classifiers, the requirement for 
pruning increases the model build time over Random Trees. 
Simple Logistic learning took longest to build in 81.9 
seconds. This is due to the additive nature of the underlying 
Boosting algorithm which incrementally builds the model 
based on previous base learners.  
 
Figure 5: Detection rates for different classifiers. 
 
Figure 6: Area under ROC curve for different classifiers. 
6.4 Results comparison with existing work 
In order to highlight the significance of our results, a 
comparison is made with those published in other static 
analysis based works where a quantitative comparison is 
possible using similar metrics. Table 8 shows how the results 
in this paper measures against the best results of [1], [20], 
[22], [23], [24], [33], and [41] respectively (using the 
available metrics). These comparative results show that our 
approach in this paper outperforms previous similar efforts. 
This is highlighted in the bottom of the table where the result 
of our proposed approach that leverages the power of 
ensemble learning clearly shows the highest detection 
accuracy and the best AUC performance.  
Table 8: Result comparison with existing work. 
Related work 
No of 
samples 
Mal/ben TPR TNR FPR ACC ERR AUC 
Yerima et al. 
 [20] 
1000/ 
1000 
0.906 0.932 0.068 0.918 0.082 0.974 
PUMA [22] 
 
    249/ 
357 
0.92  0.21 0.858  0.920 
Kirin [33] - 0.39  0.04    
Zhou et al. 
[1] 
1260/0 0.769 - - - - - 
DroidMat 
[25] 
238/ 
1500 
0.873 - - 0.9787 - - 
Peng et. al 
[24] 
378/- - - - - - 
0.94 - 
0.96 
Sarma et. al 
[23] 
121/ 
158,062 
- - - - - 
0.85- 
0.91 
Yerima et. al. 
[41] 
1000/1000 0.909 0.949 0.051 0.931 0.069 0.977 
CAPF  
with RF 
(T=10, k=50) 
2925/ 
3938 
0.973 0.977 0.023 0.975 0.025 0.993 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented a new ensemble learning based 
Android malware detection approach which can effectively 
improve detection rates to 97-99% with low false positives 
by harnessing large mixed feature sets in ways infeasible 
with traditional machine learning. With this approach there is 
no requirement for feature selection step to eliminate ‘less 
relevant’ features. This use of an extensive mixed feature set 
provides robustness and resilience to code obfuscation and 
other anti-analysis techniques being employed by malware 
authors vastly improving the chances of prompt zero-day 
malware detection. Experiments performed with large 
malware dataset from a leading AV vendor demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed scheme and the higher fidelity 
achievable compared to traditional approaches.  
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